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Abstract
People seem to be motivated by moral ideas and in this paper I
discuss how we should take this into account in positive and normative
economics. I review alternative ways of modelling moral motivation
and reasoning in positive economics and discuss how the presence of
moral motivation may challenge the standard framework of welfare
economics. I also discuss the need for invoking non-welfaristic prin-
ciples in normative economics and whether these principles can be
reconciled with the Pareto principle.
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have witnessed an increasing interest in exploring and
expanding the role of moral reasoning in economics (see for example Rabin
(1993), Hausman and McPherson (1996), Roemer (1996), Fehr and Gächter
(2000), Sen (2002), Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg (2003)). To an outsider,
this may seem like a very reasonable move, given the fact that moral issues
are everywhere in private and public aﬀairs. We are appalled by injustice
institutions, we condemn people for being immoral and we eagerly engage
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in discussions about the content of a good life. Of course, economists have
recognized this for a long time (all the way back to Adam Smith), but still
have been reluctant to broadening their analyses beyond the self-interested
economic man in positive economics and welfarism in normative economics.
Within positive economics, the standard justification has been that even
though morality at the surface may seem like an important motivational fac-
tor, closer scrutiny will show that the moral dimension only plays a role in
cases where not much it at stake (for example when paying tip on a restau-
rant) or can be completely explained by introducing more advanced models
(for example by considering a repeated game). In normative economics, con-
ventionally welfarism has been considered the only approach consistent with
the Pareto principle, and hence beyond discussion (see for example Kaplow
and Shavell, 2001). In this paper, I will argue that both these views are
misleading and that we should welcome the recent attempts to broadening
the framework of economics.
Some economists seem to fear that the recent development should make
things too easy in positive economics and too vague in normative economics.
Within positive economics, there will be no obvious way of restricting the mo-
tivational factors that may be included in the analysis and within normative
economics we may end up with extensive incompleteness in our evaluations.
But should this make us resist a careful analysis of the moral dimension?
Isn’t our aim to provide the best possible explanations and evaluations of
the social phenomena at hand? Moreover, we may wonder what really is the
cost of adopting a variety of motivational factors in positive economics. On
almost every topic, we already have a myriad of economic theories due to ex-
tensive experimentation with the way we model the economic environment,
and thus it is hard to see that anything is lost by allowing for experimentation
with the preference structures as well. Finally, the possibility of incomplete-
ness in normative analysis is certainly not avoided by restricting ourselves to
the welfaristic framework. Incompleteness may also enter the stage within
welfarism, if, for example, we only endorse the Lorenz partial ordering in the
utility space (see Foster and Sen (1997) for a further discussion of partial
orderings).
But some may still insist that by expanding the role of morality in our
theories, we are no longer doing economics. To evaluate such a claim, let us
take Lazear (2000) as the starting point. He argues that the main features
of modern economics are the reliance on maximizing behavior, equilibrium
analysis, eﬃciency considerations, abstract and formal reasoning, and empir-
2
ical testing. Do we challenge this perspective by expanding the role of moral
reasoning? Not really. There is nothing in such a move that downgrades the
role of abstract and formal reasoning and equilibrium analysis (which also
should make it clear that we are not making things easy by broadening the
framework), and, certainly, empirical testing only becomes more important
when the space of theories expands. What about the reliance on maximiza-
tion behavior and eﬃciency considerations? Again, there is no reason to give
up the modern perspective. Further analysis of the moral dimension may,
however, aﬀect the way we interpret these features, and I now turn to a
discussion of this issue.
2 Maximization and moral reasoning
The proper interpretation of maximization behavior has initiated fierce aca-
demic debates both within and outside economics (see Sen, 2002 for an
overview). The standard position among economists is given by the revealed
preference approach, commonly interpreted as saying that maximization be-
havior is equivalent to self-interested behavior. Self-interest is defined by
the preference structure guiding people’s choices, where individual choices
are assumed to be the outcome of a maximization procedure. Conceptually
nothing is changed by introducing morality as a motivational factor. The
fact that some people choose to follow a moral norm, shows, by definition,
that this act is in their self-interest.
However, in order to evaluate the claim that people’s behavior is governed
by self-interest in almost all cases of importance, we need a testable theory
of self-interest. That is, we will have to outline an a priori account of self-
interest that is independent of individual choices. One possibility is to define
self-interest in narrow economic terms, stating that people act in a self-
interested manner if they always choose the alternative that maximizes their
own income or material well-being. But it is by now well established, for
example from Ultimatum Game experiments, that the behavior of people in
general does not confirm to this hypothesis. People do seem to pay attention
to moral norms, for example fairness norms, in their behavior.
There are, of course, many other possible definitions of self-interest going
beyond the narrow economic man, and in our discussion it is particularly
interesting to consider the possibility of including the satisfaction or pleasure
derived from acting morally. Of course, it is far from trivial to apply such
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a theory of self-interest in empirical work (because it is not obvious how to
measure the degree of satisfaction derived from an act), but still conceptually
it is a possibility. The more interesting questions for this discussion, however,
are, first, whether this is a good extension of our notion of self-interest and,
second, to what extent it captures all there is to say about the role of moral
reasoning in individual choices?
First, a problem with a definition of self-interest including the pleasure
of acting morally may be that it is not of much interest for normative evalu-
ations. A basic premise in much of modern welfare economics is that we get
data for our normative analysis from observing people’s behavior. However,
this link between positive and normative economics depends strongly on the
idea that people act on the basis of a preference structure representing a
normatively relevant notion of self-interest. Hence, in the present context,
we should ask ourselves whether the pleasure derived from acting morally is
of importance when evaluating social arrangements (for example various dis-
tributive policies). If this is not the case, then the normative status of data
revealed by choices relying on this broader notion of self-interest becomes
unclear. Some may think that to question the role of revealed preferences in
welfare economics is tantamount to rejecting the Pareto principle, but, as I
will return to in the next section, it is not. Presently, it is suﬃcient to notice
that the only way of saving the equivalence hypothesis between maximiza-
tion behavior and self-interested behavior may be to introduce a definition of
self-interest that challenges a fundamental part of modern welfare economics.
Second, to focus on the pleasure or satisfaction derived from acting morally
when doing positive analysis, may be to overlook the special role of moral-
ity in individual choices. Of course, this claim calls for empirical support
(showing that this theory of self-interest does not predict individual behav-
ior correctly), but even without such documentation available and in order
to inspire empirical investigation of this issue, I believe it is of importance
to study alternative perspectives on moral choices. For this purpose, it will
be useful to outline briefly a recent formulation of moral motivation in eco-
nomics (Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg, 2003).1 They consider the problem
of providing a public goodG. One possibility is to do this via public contribu-
tion Gp, another via voluntary contributions gi = γ(ei) from all individuals
1Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg discuss a number of other intersting issues not dealt
with in the present paper, and hence I outline a stripped down version of their model
focussing on the aspects essential for our analysis.
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i = 1, ..., N , where ei is the eﬀort of individual i measured in time units.
Each individual faces the time constraint li+ei = T , where li is leisure. As is
well-known, a system of voluntary contribution implies undersupply of public
goods in the case where people act in a narrowly self-interested manner, and
the question raised by Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg is whether this also
happens when people are motivated by moral ideals.
Their basic idea is that people have an understanding of what is a morally
responsible contribution e∗i and a concern for their self-image Ii, where their
self-image is determined by the distance between their actual contribution ei
and the morally ideal contribution, i.e. Ii = f(ei, e∗i ). We may read this as
a measure of the pleasure or satisfaction people derive from fulfilling their
moral obligations. To make things simple, they work with a specific version
f(ei, e
∗
i ) = −a(ei−e∗i ). But the essential features of f are that the function is
increasing and concave in ei and that we reach a global maximum in our self-
image when we exercise what is considered the morally responsible behavior
e∗.
This formulation of moral motivation raises two important questions.
First, how do we determine morally ideal eﬀort e∗? Second, how do peo-
ple incorporate moral ideals in their choices? On the first question, Brekke,
Kverndokk and Nyborg suggest that people apply a version of the categorical
imperative of Immanuel Kant, saying that morally ideal eﬀort is determined
by the action that would maximize social welfare, given that everyone acted
in the same way. They simplify further by assuming that everyone is equal
and, moreover, agrees that utilitarianism is the correct standard for eval-
uating outcomes. In this case, the morally ideal eﬀort can be found by
maximizing the utilitarian social welfare function.
(1) maxeiW = U1 + ...+ UN ,
where utility Ui = u(li, G, Ii) is assumed to be the relevant expression
of individual welfare when calculating morally responsible behavior and we
assume that ei = ej for all j 6= i. The first order condition is given by
(2) ∂u∂li = N
∂u
∂G
∂γ
∂ei ,
which says that a person exercises morally responsible behavior when
the marginal utility of leisure exactly equals the social benefits (measured in
utilitarian terms) of the public good produced by the marginal eﬀort (when
everyone else does the same).
On the second question, they follow the standard economic approach and
include the concern for self-image (or the satisfaction derived from fulfilling
moral obligations) as an additional motivational factor in people’s maximiza-
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tion problem. That is, they assume that Ui also guides individual behavior,
where the utility function has all the standard properties. The first order
condition of the individual maximization problem is given by
(3) ∂u∂li =
∂u
∂G
∂γ
∂ei +
∂u
∂Ii (−2a(ei − e
∗
i )).
We may read (3) as saying that people in their choices are making trade-
oﬀs between the satisfaction they get from leisure, from the public good, and
from acting morally. By comparing (2) and (3), it follows straightforwardly
that people do not fulfill their moral obligations in equilibrium. If (2) and
(3) were equal, then ei = e∗i and
∂u
∂Ii (−2a(ei− e
∗
i )) = 0. But this implies that
(N −1) ∂u∂G
∂γ
∂ei = 0, which is not consistent with the assumptions of the model
(if we assume that N > 1).
Notice that this is a very general result. We need not assume that people
are equal or follow the utilitarian rule when determining morally ideal eﬀort.
Actually, we need not even assume that they agree on how to determine the
morally ideal eﬀort. In any case, as long as they are willing to trade-oﬀ
their self-image against other dimensions of their welfare and the benefit of a
better self-image is on the margin zero when exercising morally responsible
eﬀort, then they will not fulfill their moral obligations.2
To assume that people are willing to make trade-oﬀs may seem like a
trivial assumption, and actually Lazear (2000, page 101) views this as a
corollary of maximization. But this is not true, formally speaking. Giving
absolute priority to the fulfillment of moral norms can certainly be part of
a well-defined maximization procedure. Most economists, however, find this
a wildly implausible view on human behavior. Do we really believe that
anyone will follow a moral norm without considering the costs of doing so?
If not, then we have established that people make trade-oﬀs, and we can
disregard the non trade-oﬀ view as only covering non-representative people
like (maybe) Mother Theresa and Nelson Mandela.
This line of reasoning, however, overlooks the essential distinction be-
tween making trade-oﬀs when reasoning about the nature of the morally
required act (in the case of Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg, when solving
(1)), and making trade-oﬀs when considering to what extent we should do
the morally required act (that is, when solving the individual maximization
2In the case where people diﬀer in their opinion on how to calculate social welfare,
however, it is not straightforward to say that we get underrsupply of the public good. It
depends on how the definition of social welfare relates to the various opinions in society.
Moreover, notice that the theoretical result does not tell us anything about the magnitude
of deviation from the moral norm.
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problem). Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg assume that people make trade-
oﬀs in both cases, but I should like to consider an alternative formulation
saying that people only make trade-oﬀs in the first case. There are two rea-
sons for doing this. First, as economists, we should consider it important to
understand what is excluded by the framework we usually adopt, and sec-
ond I do believe that the alternative perspective (more in line with the way
philosophers think on this question) carries some weight.
If we really believe that an act is morally required, then isn’t it our
instinct to follow it without further deliberation? That is, as I see it, part of
the meaning of saying that we ought to do something. This claim does not
imply that we always follow (what we consider as) required moral norms, but
rather that our deliberative plan is to act in this manner. We may depart
from this behavior due to, for example, weakness of will or insuﬃcient self-
command (see for example Sen, 2002), but the real issue is whether these
deviations represent a consistent pattern of trade-oﬀ behavior.
The alternative perspective does not imply that personal costs do not
enter the picture in moral reasoning. They do, but only when reflecting on
whether something is a morally required act or not. By way of illustration,
we usually consider it as immoral to lie and steal, but certainly not if it is a
matter of life and death. Or we may consider it a moral obligation to vote
in an election, but probably not if it becomes extremely costly in personal
terms. In the model of Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg, this implies that it
may be appropriate to apply a utility function involving trade-oﬀs in (1), if we
believe (as is quite plausible) that there are trade-oﬀs to make between self-
image, leisure and access to public goods when calculating individual welfare.
But the very same utility function should not be used when formulating the
choice problem at the individual level, if we believe that people pursue what
they consider the morally required act without making further trade-oﬀs.
This also illustrates the importance of acknowledging a conceptual diﬀerence
between choice and well-being when formulating a utility function (as pointed
out by Sen (1973)).
Notice that the alternative model does not necessarily portray an ex-
tremely optimistic picture of human nature. Most importantly, it does not
suggest (the wildly implausible position) that people invoke moral reasoning
in all their choices. The concern here is how moral reasoning aﬀects the
choice process if people perceive the situation as within the moral domain,
and the alternative perspective may even coincide with a purely narrowly
self-interested view if people consider it as moral always to pursue their own
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narrow economic interests. Consequently, by way of illustration, it is en-
tirely consistent with low turn-out rates in elections, if these rates reflect
that a large portion of the population - for some reason or another - does not
consider voting a morally required act.
The perspective on moral behavior outlined in Brekke, Kverndokk and
Nyborg implies that people in general do not fulfill what they consider their
moral obligations, whereas the alternative perspective outlined above advo-
cates the opposite conclusion. What is the correct view on human nature?
In my view, the alternative perspective should not be rejected out of hand.
It is far from trivial to claim that people make trade-oﬀs in choices inspired
by moral reasoning, and hence as economist we should avoid considering this
as a question about a purely technical assumption on the utility function. Of
course, the trade-oﬀ perspective may still be justifiable, but that needs to be
decided on the basis of empirical analysis.
Both perspectives, however, imply that moral values play a role in indi-
vidual choices, and thus it is important to discuss the nature of these values
and how they are established in society. Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg
provide a very nice illustration of one possible approach to moral reasoning,
by arguing that people solve a maximization problem representing a formal
version of Kant’s thinking. Their approach is quite general in nature, but it
may be instructive first to look at the specific procedure outlined in the pa-
per. They assume that everyone agrees on using utilitarian reasoning as the
basis for evaluating goodness in society, whereas they use Kantian reason-
ing when specifying the relevant assumption to make about others’ behavior
when solving the moral problem.3
Many people do not find utilitarianism - or any other social welfare func-
tion - an appropriate basis for moral reasoning. There are two main reasons
for this. First, some argue that moral reasoning has to take place in de-
liberations with others (see for example Anderson (1993)), and insist that
3Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg stress that there is no conflict between utilitarian
moral philosophy and the Kantian Categorical Imperative in their model. That is true,
if one restricts utilitarian moral philosophy to be about the goodness of social states.
However, many utilitarians will insist that utilitarian moral philsophy also has implications
for the assumptions we make about others’ behavior when determining morally ideal eﬀort.
The (act) utilitarian perspective implies that we should solve the moral maximization
problem by assuming that people do what they actually do (and not that they do the
morally required act, as in Kantian reasoning), and this is what makes utilitarianism such
a demanding moral system at the individual level.
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any formal individual procedure of the kind suggested by Brekke, Kvern-
dokk and Nyborg will fail for this reason. I will not pursue this perspective,
but rather turn to a second line of criticism arguing that the formulation of
Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg places too much importance on individual
preferences. This may not be an important issue in a model where everyone
is equal, but if we extend the analysis to a world with heterogeneous indi-
viduals, we get some questionable moral implications within the framework
outlined above. By way of illustration, let us assume that people diﬀer in
their preferences for leisure. In this case, we cannot solve the moral problem
by assuming that everyone else acts in the same manner, but rather have
to assume that everyone else acts according to the same rule. This implies
that we have to solve the maximization problem for every individual in so-
ciety, which will give us a vector of eﬀort levels specifying the morally ideal
action for each person. It is easily seen that this procedure (whether we use
utilitarianism or any other social welfare function) implies that two persons
only diﬀering in their preferences for leisure will face diﬀerent moral require-
ments. The person valuing leisure strongly (on the margin) is required to
exercise less eﬀort than the other person. From a welfaristic point of view,
this may seem fair, but I will claim that it is contrary to a widely shared
moral intuition saying that people should be held responsible for their own
preferences, which in this case implies that the morally ideal eﬀort should be
the same for both individuals. An interesting topic for future research would
be to construct experiments testing the two alternative hypotheses on moral
reasoning within the setting of Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg.
The result from such experiments would not only be of importance for
positive economics. If it were the case that people are motivated by non-
welfaristic ideas, then we also need carefully to study the possibility of in-
corporating non-welfaristic reasoning in normative economics. I now turn to
a discussion of this issue.
3 Welfarism and moral reasoning
Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg assume that moral reasoning takes place
within a welfaristic framework, as we can see from the formulation in (1).4
4In the following, I only discuss welfarism within a single-profile setting, i.e. I do
not consider cases where there is a change in the profile of utility functions. For a brief
discussion of the multi-profile setting and welfarism, see Fleurbaey, Tungodden and Chang
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But welfarism does not seem to capture the informational richness and focus
present in public moral debates, where concepts like human rights, liberties,
responsibility, freedom, equal opportunity, basic needs, and so on are com-
monly used. There is an extensive academic literature, inspired to a large
extent by the work of Sen (see Sen (1999) and Sen (2002) for overviews),
that aim at establishing alternatives to the welfaristic framework, but these
non-welfaristic approaches have been met with skepticism within economics
(see for example Kaplow and Shavell, 2001). There are mainly two reasons
for this. Many seem to fear that normative economics becomes too vague if
we move beyond the welfaristic framework; moreover it is commonly assumed
that non-welfaristic approaches violate the Pareto principle. In my view, the
problem of vagueness or incompleteness is not a reason for avoiding taking
seriously all the valuable dimensions in normative evaluations, even though
it may create problems in practical choice situations (see Chang (1997) for
a further discussion of practical reasoning in the context of vagueness and
incommensurability). As pointed out by Sen on a number of occasions, it is
certainly better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong. Hence, the more
interesting question is to what extent non-welfaristic principles are in line
with the Pareto principle and capture something of normative importance.
Some readers may not consider violations of the Pareto principle too prob-
lematic either, because they should like to question the status of a person’s
preferences as a representation of his or her true interests. This criticism
raises an important question about the role of preference formation in nor-
mative reasoning, but I will not pursue this issue here. In the following, I
will simply assume that people’s preferences provide a legitimate expression
of their interests, such that if some person prefers social arrangement x to
social arrangement y, then x is more in line with the true intersts of this per-
son than y. In this case, the Pareto principle becomes equivalent to what we
may name the principle of personal interest, saying that if the true interests
of everyone is more in line with x than y then x should be considered better
than y.5 The important question now is whether it is necessary and possible
(2003).
5This principle is related to what Broome (1991) calls the principle of personal good,
but with one important diﬀerence. The principle of personal good says that x is better
than y if everyone is better oﬀ in x than y, whereas the principle of personal interest deals
with the interests of each person more generally. If the principle of personal good applies in
a comparison of two alternatives, then we should expect the principle of personal interests
to apply as well. But the converse implication does not necessarily hold. It may very well
10
to combine such a principle with non-welfaristic considerations.
It is important to notice that in general, non-welfaristic considerations do
not aim at challenging the Pareto principle (or the principle of personal in-
terest). They are introduced in order to solve cases not covered by the Pareto
principle, that is cases where we have a conflict of interest in society. There
are two reasons for introducing non-welfaristic considerations (see also Brun
and Tungodden, 2004), the pragmatic and the fundamental. The underly-
ing idea of the pragmatic argument is that “we must respect the constraints
of simplicity and availability of information to which any practical political
conception [of justice] is subject” (Rawls (1993), p. 182). Welfarism implies
that interpersonal comparisons should be based on comparisons of preference
satisfaction, which in general is considered to be non-observable. Thus, the
welfaristic framework does not provide a practicable public basis for solving
interest conflicts. The fundamental critique of welfarism is concerned with
the substantive claims of this framework. Rawls (1971, 1993), for example,
argues that utility or well-being is not the relevant feature of states of af-
fairs. Appropriate claims should refer to an idea of rational advantage that
is independent of any particular comprehensive doctrine of the good, and
for this purpose Rawls suggests a list of primary goods. Rawls’ perspective
can be considered as a version of equal opportunity ethics, which in its most
general form states that society should indemnify agents against poor out-
comes that are the consequences of factors that are beyond their control, but
not against outcomes that are the consequences of factors that are within
their control (Roemer 1998). Hence, if we believe that people should be held
responsible for their preferences, then we should not rely on preference infor-
mation when solving interest conflicts. Similarly, we may interpret a focus
on human rights and basic needs (or basic capabilities in the language of
Sen (1985, 1992, 1999)) as alternative non-welfaristic perspectives on how to
solve interest conflicts without paying attention to individual preferences.
Is it reasonable to ignore individual preferences in cases where we have a
conflict of interest? Let me provide a very simple example that should be of
interest when discussing this question (for further discussion of this issue, see
among others Fleurbaey (1995a,b), Roemer (1996), Cappelen and Tungod-
be the case that some people prefer x to y, even though they are worse oﬀ in x than y
(as we also pointed out in the previous section in the discussion of the distinction between
choice and well-being)
Notice that we may state weaker and stronger versions of these principles, see Suzumura
(2001) in the case of the Pareto principle.
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den (2002, 2003), and Tungodden (forthcoming)). Consider the case where
we have two individuals who have already made their choices with respect
to working hours, and where we assume that both value leisure and con-
sumption. We are considering whether we should redistribute consumption
(or income) between them. In order to make things simple, we also assume
that there are no incentive problems (i.e. they will not make any further
choices) and that we have complete information about their utility func-
tions. Hence, we face a first best taxation problem where all redistributive
policies are Pareto optimal. What kind of information do we consider rele-
vant in this case? Welfarists will not be concerned with budget information,
and consequently the welfaristic redistributive policy will be independent of
whether they had equal opportunities or not. Equal opportunity ethics, on
the contrary, completely neglects preference information and focuses only on
the budget restrictions. If they both had the same opportunities, then this
approach sees no reason to redistribute. If the budget restrictions diﬀered,
however, then equal opportunity ethics may defend some redistribution.
I believe that many people share the views of equal opportunity ethics
in this example. If so, then it illustrates that it is far from obvious that we
should apply the welfaristic framework when solving interest conflicts. But
what about more complex cases where we face incentive and informational
problems? In answering this question, it is important to notice the following
asymmetry. The fact that welfarism does not work well in a simple example
is suﬃcient to make clear that there is something problematic with this ap-
proach, but the fact that equal opportunity ethics works well in the very same
example does not imply that it is a sound approach more generally. Hence, in
order to provide a thorough evaluation of alternatives to welfarism, we need
to see how they work in all interest conflicts and to what extent they are in
line with the Pareto principle. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue
such an extensive discussion of non-welfaristic reasoning, so let me here only
briefly comment on the compatibility with Pareto principle. It turns out that
a number of non-welfaristic ways of solving interest conflicts imply a viola-
tion of the Pareto principle, if we impose certain consistency requirements
on our normative evaluations (see for example Sen (1970), Gibbard (1979),
Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2001), and Brun and Tungodden (2004)). These
results may be interpreted in two ways. If we considered the consistency
conditions as logical requirements, then we can read the results as saying
that it is not possible to combine these non-welfaristic approaches with the
Pareto principle. However, if we consider the consistency requirements from
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a more pragmatic choice perspective, then we can read the results as saying
that we will face some choice situations with no best alternative if we en-
dorse both the non-welfaristic framework for solving interest conflicts and the
Pareto principle (see also, among others, Sen (1993) and Tungodden (2003)
for a discussion of consistency requirements in social choices).
Lazear (2000) stresses that ”[Pareto] eﬃciency is a concept that together
with equilibrium, pushes economists to do a particular kind of analysis. When
economists model a situation and the resulting equilibrium is ineﬃcient, usu-
ally there are trades that could have occurred that are implicitly or explicitly
ruled out. The analyst or his critics are induced to ask what the reasons
are and what market or other institutions could arise to remedy the situ-
ation...The notion that eﬃciency is a natural outcome motivates a larger
series of questions and initiates deeper analysis. It also permits economists
to make clear, unambiguous policy statements, although the assumptions
that lie behind welfare economics are somewhat controversial” (p. 102). The
importance of eﬃciency analysis is beyond doubt, but the distributive issue
is also an extremely important part of economics. In the same way as we
pursue remedies for ineﬃcient allocations, we need to consider how to es-
tablish institutions that support equilibria with a just resource allocation.
But this demands a clear understanding of how to properly evaluate social
arrangements from the distributive point of view. Lazear seems to suggest
that Pareto eﬃciency goes hand in hand with welfarism (if we read welfare
economics as welfarism), but I hope that the present discussion has made
clear that this is not the case. Welfarism is an informational perspective
with questionable implications in distributive conflicts, whereas the Pareto
principle is an (almost) uncontroversial condition on how to solve cases where
individual interests overlap. Consequently, we should aim at establishing a
non-welfaristic perspective capturing our real concerns in distributive con-
flicts. Such a perspective, however, may be hard to reconcile with the Pareto
principle, and hence we may have to endorse the view of Rawls (1971): “All
theories are presumably mistaken in places. The real question at any given
time is which of the views already proposed is the best approximation overall”
(p. 52).
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4 Concluding remarks
In my view, there are at least three reasons for welcoming the recent work
on morality and economics. First, even though it may turn out that the
economic profession is not convinced by the arguments and models outlined
within this literature, it will certainly contribute to a deeper understanding
of the nature of mainstream economics. It is only by considering alternative
approaches that we can really reflect upon the standard methods and solu-
tions within a field. Second, as I see it, much of the recent work on economics
and morality does not really challenge the basic framework of economics, but
is rather an interesting application of it. Finally, as I have discussed briefly in
this paper, the present literature seems to provide us with some important
insights in both positive and normative economics, which may change the
way we think about maximization behavior and welfarism. There are many
unresolved questions within the field, however, and hence it should be a most
promising area for future research.
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